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Abstract: 
Bayesian learning provides the core concept of processing noisy information. In standard 
Bayesian frameworks, assessing the price impact of information requires perfect knowledge 
of news’ precision. In practice, however, precision is rarely dis- closed. Therefore, we extend 
standard Bayesian learning, suggesting traders infer news’ precision from magnitudes of 
surprises and from external sources. We show that interactions of the different precision 
signals may result in highly nonlinear price responses. Empirical tests based on intra-day T-
bond futures price reactions to employment releases confirm the model’s predictions and 
show that the effects are statistically and economically significant. 
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Precision Signals Bayesian learning is a powerful concept, explaining why rational market participants
may react diﬀerently to seemingly identical news: precise news moves prices more
strongly than imprecise, noisy information. However, while it is typically assumed that
the news’ precision is known, in practice, it is rarely disclosed. Consequently, traders
have to make a judgement on their own. Our analysis focuses on this lack of (perfect)
precision knowledge: First, we extend standard Bayesian learning models to cases where
traders have to gather precision estimates. A major implication of this extension is that
price response coeﬃcients – measuring the reaction of prices to news – strongly depend
on traders’ perception of information precision. This explains non-linear price reactions
to unanticipated information. Second, we test this implication of non-constant price
impact coeﬃcients by analyzing high-frequency price responses in the U.S. T-Bond fu-
tures market to the U.S. employment report.1 Obtaining strong empirical evidence that
instantaneous price reactions exhibit pronounced non-linearities which depend crucially
on traders’ perception of news’ precision, we provide new insights into price discovery
and market participants’ learning behavior in an uncertain environment.
Standard Bayesian learning provides a clear answer how market prices react to infor-
mation of diﬀering quality – if this quality is perfectly known: (i) price reactions are
linear in the amount of unanticipated information and (ii) the precision of new informa-
tion relative to the precision of pre-announcement expectations determines how much
market participants adjust their expectations. Hence, noisy (or diﬀuse) information
has little impact on prices, whereas precise news moves market participants’ expecta-
tions and hence prices more strongly. However, so far it is theoretically and empirically
quite unclear how prices adjust in the much more realistic case when news’ precision is
unknown.
1Several studies show that among macroeconomic announcements, employment ﬁgures have by far
the most pronounced impact on ﬁnancial markets, in particular, on bond and foreign exchange markets
(see, e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, Fleming and Remolona, 1999, or Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold
and Vega, 2003).
1A ﬁrst contribution to relax the usual assumptions of normally distributed variables
with perfectly known parameters is provided by Subramanyam (1996). In his frame-
work, traders try to infer the precision of news from a single noisy precision signal,
i.e., the magnitude of the surprise component in an announcement. Due to this strict
link between the expected precision and the signal magnitude, surprisingly large news
may be interpreted as too good to be true.2 Consequently, price reactions are relatively
strong for small surprises but relatively weak for big ones. This results in S-shaped price
reactions to unexpected news. Nevertheless, a restrictive assumption in this setting is
that market participants assess the reliability of news based solely on the released ﬁg-
ures’ magnitudes and ignore any other potentially available information on the news’
precision. This is rather unrealistic in practice and can cause severe misinterpretations
of the announced ﬁgures. Indeed, big surprises may very well be quite precise, and then,
should generate strong price reactions.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that market participants consider diﬀerent sources
of information when assessing news’ precision. For the employment report, Hautsch
and Hess (2007) show that revisions of past headline ﬁgures provide information which
can be exploited for such a purpose. Furthermore, they show that prices in the T-
bond futures market indeed react more strongly to employment information when this
revision-based precision estimate indicates a high information quality. Similarly, Pilotte
and Manuel (1996) analyze price reactions in response to stock split announcements ar-
guing that investor’s conﬁdence in the quality of a signal relies on their past experience.
Furthermore, considering company reports, Sloan (1996), Feltham and Pae (2000), and
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005), among others, show that accruals provide
information about the quality of stated earnings. Overall, these studies suggest that
2See Mattsson, Voorneveld and Weibull (2007). In an early contribution, Milgrom (1981) studied
this eﬀect and provided conditions for monotonicity of price reactions in the announced information.
These monotonicity results, based on a monotone likelihood ratio criterion, were recently generalized
by Mattsson et al. (2007) in a discrete choice model under uncertainty.
2market participants may obtain precision signals by inspecting additional information
related to a particular announcement.
Therefore, building on Subramanyam (1996) we develop a learning model allowing for
uncertainty in news’ precision where traders infer about the quality of information using
two diﬀerent sources as precision signals. First, so-called ‘external’ precision signals –
such as the sample size of a survey or the reputation of an auditing company – directly
inﬂuence the perception of information precision. Second, the released information it-
self serves as an ‘internal’ precision signal. In accordance with Subramanyam (1996),
this implies that the probability of news being imprecise increases with its magnitude
(i.e., such news is believed to be too big to be true). We show that such learning behavior
implies non-linear, S-shaped price response functions, i.e., the price response coeﬃcient
becomes smaller for big absolute surprises. Additionally, the model predicts stronger
reactions to news which is perceived to be more precise given additional information.
In this case, the S-shaped curvature of the price response function becomes even more
pronounced and deviates strongly from linearity. We also show that our results both
hold in a framework where the precision of the prior distribution is itself uncertain and
are valid for a wide range of distributional assumptions.
In an empirical analysis of the price reactions of CBOT T-bond futures to the release
of U.S. employment data, we provide strong evidence in favor of Bayesian learning
under these two types of precision signals. From data revisions in employment releases,
we extract release-speciﬁc external precision measures, which do not depend on the
surprise itself. The estimated price response curves clearly reveal that prices (i) adjust
non-linearly in response to unanticipated information with an S-shaped pattern and
(ii) react signiﬁcantly diﬀerently depending on the external precision signal. Also from
an economic perspective, our results are strongly signiﬁcant. We show that ignoring
the available precision signals leads to severe estimation errors when determining the
3price impact of a news release.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section presents
a theoretical Bayesian learning framework which allows for the precision of arriving
news to be unknown as well as for uncertainty in the prior distribution. Section 2
describes the high-frequency return data as well as the employment data and outlines
the estimation procedure. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section
3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
1 A Bayesian Learning Model
1.1 Standard Bayesian Learning
Bayesian learning models provide a framework for analyzing how new information is
incorporated into expectations and prices when prior information and incoming news
contain uncertainty. Throughout our analysis we assume that all market participants
are homogeneous and have the same information just before the release of some public
announcement. The price P of a risky asset is assumed to be proportional to traders’
expectations of an economic variable X with proportionality factor ν, i.e. P = ν·E[X].
The beliefs on X prior to the announcement are assumed to be normally distributed
with known parameters, i.e. X ∼ N(µF,1/ρF), where µF is the mean of the prior infor-
mation on X and ρF denotes their precision, deﬁned as the inverse of the variance. This
prior information represents the market’s conditional probability distribution of the
variable X given all available information, including, for example, all publicly released
analysts’ forecasts. Empirical research on the impact of scheduled announcements typ-
ically assumes that the distribution of prior beliefs in the market may be approximated
by the distribution of analysts’ forecasts. Hence, it is implicitly assumed that analysts’
forecasts are unbiased for X, and, together with their cross-sectional dispersion, they
4provide a consistent estimate of the market’s prior information.3
Now, say an announcement is released, providing a noisy estimate of X. It is assumed
that the released ﬁgure includes an additive error, i.e., A = X + ε, where ε is a zero-
mean normally-distributed error term with variance V ar[ε] = 1/ρε and E[X · ε] =
0. Consequently, traders receive an unbiased estimate of the underlying variable X,
whose precision is reﬂected by ρε. The additive error term structure implies that the
unconditional variance of the news release exceeds the variance of the market’s prior
information. Accordingly, the announcement A is distributed as A ∼ N(µF,1/ρA).
After observing the public announcement, traders adjust their beliefs according to
Bayes’ rule. Traders’ beliefs after the announcement are normally distributed with
µP := E[X | A] = µF + (A − µF)
ρA
ρF
= µF + (A − µF)
ρε
ρF + ρε
(1)
and
ρP := V ar[X | A]−1 = ρF + ρε. (2)
Consequently, after traders observe the signal A, the market price of the risky asset
changes as
∆P = ν · (µP − µF) = ν · S · π, (3)
where π denotes the so-called ‘price-response coeﬃcient’
π :=
ρA
ρF
=
ρε
ρε + ρF
. (4)
Hence, the main model implication is that price changes are proportional to the surprise
S := A − µF, where the proportionality factor π depends on the relative precision of
announcements and the market’s forecast.
3See, e.g., Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995), Mohammed and Yadav (2002), Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Hautsch and Hess (2007).
51.2 Surprises as an ‘Internal’ Signal of the Precision of Releases
Announcements such as employment ﬁgures are usually released without an associated
precision measure, which contradicts the assumptions of the standard Bayesian learn-
ing model. Therefore, Subramanyam (1996) relaxes this framework by treating news’
precision to be unknown and assuming that the announcement is conditionally nor-
mally distributed given the true precision, i.e., A|ρA ∼ N(µF,ρA). Formally, Bayesian
updating of traders works in a way similar to the basic framework, yielding
µP = E[X | A] = µF + (A − µF)
E[ρA | A]
ρF
= µF + S · π(S), (5)
with E[ρA|A] representing traders’ conditional expectation of the signal’s precision
given its realization. Hence, it turns out that the price response coeﬃcient π(S) is
no longer constant but rather depends on the absolute surprise. Consequently, the
latter serves as an ‘internal’ signal of news’ precision. As shown by Subramanyam
(1996) and illustrated in a more general framework in the next section, this generates a
nonlinear relationship between the magnitude of the surprise and the implied update of
traders’ beliefs. In particular, if traders observe high absolute values of unanticipated
information, they conclude that these stem from an announcement with low precision.
This reduces their adjustment of beliefs in absolute terms, which in the extreme case
may even generate negative marginal contributions of surprises, resulting in an S-shaped
price response curve. However, this direct link between the amount of unanticipated
information and the expected precision is relatively restrictive, since it implies that
big surprises are always too big to be true. But in an environment where information
precision is high, occasionally, big surprises may occur as well. In such cases, we would
expect to observe stronger price reaction, which is ruled out in this setup.
61.3 ‘External’ Signals of the Precision of Releases
Extending the previous setting, we assume that traders not only evaluate the released
information itself when assessing news’ precision but also employ other data sources. For
instance, for the U.S. employment report, Hautsch and Hess (2007) show that traders
may infer the precision of announced employment ﬁgures by inspecting the time series
of historical revisions of the headline ﬁgure. Since revisions in announcements reﬂect
(ex post-) sampling errors, a natural precision measure arises from their conditional
variance.
Suppose that market participants are able to observe a so-called external signal ˆ ρA for
the precision of the announcement ρA. Here, ‘external’ refers to cases where the signal is
not directly linked to the announced ﬁgure itself. For example, ˆ ρA might be information
on the sample size of a survey, the reliability of data collection or a precision estimate
based on (past) revisions, as in Hautsch and Hess (2007).
Let this additional precision signal follow a conditionally normal distribution given
the true precision ρA, i.e., ˆ ρA | ρA ∼ N(ρA,σ2
ˆ ρA). Moreover, we assume that the an-
nouncement A and the precision signal ˆ ρA are conditionally independent given the true
precision ρA. Therefore, the precision signal and the news release are only linked indi-
rectly via the true precision. If σ2
ˆ ρA reaches zero, the signal reveals the true precision of
the announcement. In this case, the surprise itself no longer serves as an internal preci-
sion signal, and we are back to the standard Bayesian learning model. If σ2
ˆ ρA is diﬀerent
from zero, both precision signals are taken into account by market participants. In a
way analogous to the updating equations given above, traders form their beliefs as4
µP = E [X | A, ˆ ρA] = µF + (A − µF)
E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA]
ρF
= µF + S · π(S, ˆ ρA). (6)
4For a formal derivation, see Appendix A.
7As before, adjustments in traders’ beliefs depend symmetrically on the amount of sur-
prise associated with the news. However, now the market incorporates additional infor-
mation into its price formation. This is reﬂected by the price response coeﬃcient π(·)
depending not only on S but also on ˆ ρA. As shown in Appendix A, the conditional
expectation of precision E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA] is computed by
E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA] =
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
, (7)
where f(·) denote the corresponding conditional and unconditional p.d.f.’s and the
support SA of f(ρA) is given by SA ∈ (ρF,∞). Hence, it turns out that the expected
precision depends not only on ˆ ρA and A but also on the unconditional prior distribution
of the precision, f(ρA).
In Proposition 1, we will show in accordance with Subramanyam (1996) that the amount
of unanticipated information inﬂuences the expected precision of the announcement
negatively. This result holds irrespective of the choice of the underlying prior distribu-
tion f(ρA):
Proposition 1 The price response coeﬃcient π(S, ˆ ρA) is strictly decreasing in
the absolute magnitude of the surprise |S| for any prior distribution f(ρA), i.e.,
∂π(S, ˆ ρA)/∂|S| < 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Therefore, prices react relatively strongly to less surprising news and relatively weakly
to news with a high element of surprise. Consequently, there are two eﬀects determining
the change in beliefs (µP − µF) after an announcement is made: First, given the price
response coeﬃcient π(·), a big (small) surprise S = A − µF strengthens (weakens)
the price reaction linearly. Second, according to Proposition 1, a big (small) surprise
8decreases (increases) the expected signal precision and thus decreases (increases) π(·).
As shown in Proposition 2, the latter eﬀect induces price reactions which are S-shaped
in absolute surprises:
Proposition 2 The marginal impact of the surprise S on investors’ updates of beliefs,
µP − µF, is given by ∂(µP − µF)/∂S = π(S, ˆ ρA) − S2ρ−1
F V ar[ρA | A, ˆ ρA].
Proof: See Appendix A.
Hence, investors marginally update their expectations in the direction of the surprise
as long as π(S, ˆ ρA)−S2ρ−1
F V ar[ρA | A, ˆ ρA] > 0. However, if |S| becomes large, the rela-
tionship may reverse and the marginal eﬀect of absolute surprises may become negative,
i.e., ∂(µP −µF)/∂S < 0. These eﬀects are enforced if ρF is small and V ar[ρA | A, ˆ ρA] is
large. Consequently, we obtain an S-shaped price reaction, as graphically illustrated in
Figure 1. Note that in the case of a degenerated prior distribution f(ρA), we get a linear
response, as in the basic model. Hence, the result of an S-shaped relationship between
surprises and traders’ updates of expectations according to Subramanyam (1996) still
holds in this extended framework.
However, the following proposition shows that traders’ conditional expectations of news’
precision depend positively on the external precision signal ˆ ρA. Hence, traders update
their conditional expectations more strongly (less strongly) if ˆ ρA increases (decreases).
Consequently, ˆ ρA aﬀects the price response coeﬃcient π(S, ˆ ρA) in the opposite direction
of |S|.
Proposition 3 The price response coeﬃcient π(S, ˆ ρA) and the absolute signal re-
sponse |µF − µP| are strictly increasing in the observed value of the preci-
sion signal ˆ ρA for any prior distribution f(ρA), i.e., ∂π(S, ˆ ρA)/∂ˆ ρA > 0 and
9∂|µp − µF|/∂ˆ ρA > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The proposition also states that a central implication of standard Bayesian learning is
maintained even if the true precision parameter of the news is replaced by a noisy signal:
market prices react more strongly to news which is perceived to be more precise, whereas
news which appears to be imprecise induces rather moderate market reactions. However,
as shown in Figure 1, the existence of an ‘external’ precision measure ˆ ρA induces an
additional eﬀect which ampliﬁes the S-shape. A higher ρA leads to a ﬂattening of the
price response curve for small surprises near zero but to more pronounced S-shaped
price responses to big surprises.
1.4 Accounting for Uncertainty in the Prior Distribution
So far, we have assumed that traders have normally-distributed prior beliefs on the
distribution of the variable X with perfectly known parameters. However, traders gen-
erate their views by, for example, relying on analysts’ forecasts; thus, they face estima-
tion errors. In practice, traders might approximate the precision of prior information
by the dispersion of diﬀerent analysts’ forecasts. However, the quality of such esti-
mates is itself subject to uncertainty. In order to capture uncertainty in the precision
of prior information, we assume that this precision is random and follows a distribu-
tion f(ρF). Then, X is assumed to be conditionally normally distributed given ρF,
i.e. X | ρF ∼ N(µF,1/ρF). This results in a scale mixture distribution for the prior
distribution, yielding
f(X) =
 
SF
f(X | ρF)f(ρF)dρF (8)
with SF ∈ (0,∞). Nevertheless, as shown in Proposition 4, all previous results still
hold:
10Proposition 4 If the prior distribution of traders follows a scale mixture of normal
distributions, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 still hold.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Obviously, this proposition states that our analysis is not restricted to cases with
normally-distributed variables but holds for a wide class of distributions, including
fat-tailed prior distributions.
1.5 Testable Implications of the Model
The learning model outlined above yields hypotheses on how traders’ expectations ad-
just to new information. Assuming that prices are proportional to traders’ expectations
of the observed market variable, the following testable hypotheses arise:
(1) The standard Bayesian learning model with perfectly-known normal distributions
presented in Section 11.1 implies a linear price response function,
∆P = ν · S · π.
Here, a higher magnitude of surprise implies higher absolute price reactions, since
the price response coeﬃcient π is a constant and known parameter which does
not depend on the revealed unanticipated information, S. The price response
coeﬃcient, then, is determined by the precision of the announcement and the
precision of the released data.
(2) As shown in Section 11.2, the model suggested by Subramanyam (1996) implies
∆P = ν · S · π(S).
11Here, news precision is unknown and is thus inferred from the magnitude of
surprises. Since large surprises serve as a signal for a low precision of news, the
price response coeﬃcient π(S) decreases in the absolute size of the surprise |S|,
implying an S-shaped relationship between ∆P and S.
(3) Allowing for additional external precision signals ˆ ρA as in Section 11.3, we get
∆P = ν · S · π(S, ˆ ρA).
The previous result of an S-shaped price response curve still holds, but we ob-
serve the additional eﬀect of a positive relationship between ∆P and ˆ ρA. In this
case, both eﬀects might work in opposite directions and the S-shape of the price
response curve is ampliﬁed if news’ precision is high.
2 Data and Empirical Framework
2.1 Data
The model implications outlined above will be empirically tested in the following sec-
tions. Note that we do not estimate this model in a structural way, since this would
require additional structural assumptions in order to estimate E[ρA|A, ˆ ρA]. We rather
test for the implications summarized above in reduced form by estimating the shape
of the price reaction curve in response to S and the perceived precision of news |ˆ ρA|.
We use intraday returns of CBOT T-bond futures corresponding to one of the most
liquid futures markets as well as monthly releases of the U.S. employment report. The
latter is by far the most inﬂuential scheduled macroeconomic release, and its impact
on ﬁnancial markets is investigated in a wide range of studies.5 While the employment
5Several empirical studies provide evidence that unanticipated information in the employment report
has a strong inﬂuence not only on bond market prices (e.g. Becker, Finnerty and Kopecky (1996),
Fleming and Remolona (1999c), and Hautsch and Hess (2002)) but also on foreign exchange rates
12report contains detailed information on the employment situation in the U.S., market
participants focus in particular on two headline ﬁgures: the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure and
the unemployment rate ﬁgure. The disclosure of this information oﬀers a rare opportu-
nity to analyze Bayesian learning eﬀects in the adjustment of price in response to news,
since both the amount of unanticipated information and a release-speciﬁc precision
measure can be obtained.
Hautsch and Hess (2007) document the importance of news’ precision in a framework
where traders are assumed to use external information to make inferences about the
precision of news. To facilitate a comparison with these results, we employ a similar
data set based on two-minute log returns of T-bond futures in 90-minute windows
around employment announcements.6 However, our dataset covers an extended sample
period of 15 years, from January 4th, 1991 to December 2nd, 2005. These high fre-
quency T-bond data are obtained from the Chicago Board of Trade (via their Time
& Sales records). From our sample period we obtain 161 event windows in which no
other major information event occurs aside from the release of the employment report.7
Thus information processing during these event windows is driven only by employment
ﬁgures. Like previous studies, we use so-called consensus estimates, i.e., medians of an-
alysts’ forecasts, to approximate the anticipated part of information in the employment
headline ﬁgures. These analysts’ forecasts are obtained from Informa Global Markets
(e.g. Hardouvelis (1988), Andersen et al. (2003)) and stock prices (e.g. Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan
(2005)).
6Log returns are calculated on the basis of the last trading price observed during a two-minute
interval. We use the same time window, 8:22-9:52 a.m. EST. Since trading starts at 8:20, the ﬁrst return
can be calculated for the interval 8:22-8:24. In order to avoid the inﬂuence of other announcements,
released at 10:00 a.m. EST., only price observations up to 9:52 a.m. EST are used. Like most previous
studies, we focus on the front month contract, i.e., the most actively traded contract among the nearby
and second nearby contracts.
7We eliminate 15 days in which other reports were released during our 90-minute window, particu-
larly releases of Leading Indicators, Personal Income, and Gross Domestic Product. Furthermore, we
eliminate one inadvertently early employment release in November 1998 (Fleming and Remolona 1999b)
and another three releases which were presumably aﬀected by the temporary shutdown of federal agen-
cies due to the budget dispute during the Clinton administration (see Hess, 2004). This leaves us with
a total of 161 observations.
13(formerly S&P Money Market Services, MMS). The announcement data are extracted
from the original, unrevised employment releases from the Bureau of Labour Statistics
(BLS). In accordance with other studies, we concentrate on the headline information
in the employment report, i.e., surprises in the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure SNF and the
unemployment rate SUN.8 Note that nonfarm payrolls are revised in the subsequent
month. We include this revision information, RNF,m, into our analysis. In order to facil-
itate a direct comparison across the information components, all surprise and revision
variables are measured in percentage changes.
In order to extract release-speciﬁc precision measures for the monthly employment
releases, we employ the procedure suggested by Hautsch and Hess (2007). First, as
a precision measure for prior information, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts before
an announcement is used.9 In particular, the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts
ˆ sF,m for a particular month m is interpreted as a measure of the cross-sectional dis-
persion of expectations and serves as a proxy for the precision of prior information,
i.e. ˆ ρF,m = 1
 
ˆ s2
F,m. Second, in order to obtain a measure for the precision of the
announced information itself, a one-step-ahead prediction of the (conditional) vari-
ance of revisions is used. Using revisions in nonfarm payrolls is based on the idea
that a large revision of the previous month’s ﬁgure (as provided in the current re-
port) indicates that the precision of that ﬁgure has obviously been poor. Hautsch and
Hess (2007) illustrate that the magnitude of revisions, and thus the size of estima-
tion errors in announced ﬁgures, are autocorrelated. Hence, the size of revisions as a
proxy for news’ precision is predictable. Corresponding forecasts are obtained from an
8The unanticipated information contained in the releases of month m is then measured as the
diﬀerence between the announced ﬁgure A.,m and its median forecast µF,.,m. For instance, the surprise
in a nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure,SNF,m, is determined as SNF,m = ANF,m − µF,NF,m.
9This is in accordance with Abarbanell et al. (1995), Mohammed and Yadav (2002), Andersen et
al. (2003) and Hautsch and Hess (2007), among others. However, note that the information set of all
publicly available prior information may be even much larger. Furthermore, as Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2006) argue, forecasts may be announced strategically depending on the forecaster’s loss function, e.g.
as the median of a distribution.
14ARMA-GARCH model ﬁtted to the time series of revisions. Then, ˆ ρε,m is obtained by
ˆ ρε,m =   V ar[RNF,m|RNF,m−1,RNF,m−2,...]−1.10
In order to reduce the impact of estimation noise on the quantiﬁcation of news’ precision
and avoid the need to impose additional assumptions on the functional relationship
between the precision measure and the induced price reaction, we restrict our analysis
to a distinction between precise and imprecise news. These two states are identiﬁed
based on a proxy of the price response coeﬃcient ˆ πm = ˆ ρε,m/(ˆ ρε,m + ˆ ρF,m). We deﬁne
news to be precise if ˆ πm is equal to or above its sample median and imprecise otherwise.
Estimating the relationship between price changes, the surprise S and the derived
precision dummy allows us to test for the implications of the generalized Bayesian
learning framework outlined above.
2.2 Speciﬁcation of Price Response Curves
Using two-minute log returns rt in the described 90-minute-windows around the em-
ployment release we estimate alternative ARMA-ARCH speciﬁcations augmented with
appropriate sets of explanatory variables xt, i.e.,
rt = c +
p1  
j=1
φ1,jrt−j +
q1  
j=1
φ2,jεt−j + x′
tβ + εt, εt ∼ N(0,ht), (9)
with
ht = ω +
p2  
j=1
ψ1,jε2
t−j + z′
tθ. (10)
Here, t indexes the two-minute intervals around the release of the employment report
for a given month m. In particular, t = 0 indicates the interval immediately following
the announcement, i.e. 8:30 - 8:32 a.m. EST and t = 1 denotes the 8:32 - 8:34 interval.
For simplicity, the index m is suppressed.
10For more details, see Hautsch and Hess (2007).
15The conditional variance equation (10) captures ARCH eﬀects. In addition, zt (with
corresponding parameter vector θ) consists of regressors {¯ t, sin(2 · r · π · ¯ t), cos(2 · r ·
π · ¯ t)} with r = 1,...,R associated with a Fourier series approximation of order R
deﬁned over the interval ¯ t ∈ (0,1) capturing the used 90-minutes window around the
announcement. This allow us to control for (deterministic) seasonal volatility patterns
around news releases. Preliminary studies show that such a speciﬁcation captures most
of the variation in conditional variances during the analyzed 90-minute interval.11
To test for the diﬀerent implications of the Bayesian learning model discussed above,
we use alternative speciﬁcations of the vector xt. In particular, to impose the standard
Bayesian learning model in accordance with Section 11.1, a dummy variable D8:30
indicating the interval 8:30 - 8:32 and a linear term for the surprise D8:30 · SNF are
included (among other variables) as regressors in xt:
x′
t = [..., D8:30 , D8:30 · SNF ,...],
where SNF,m contains the unexpected component in the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure for
month m. Obviously this speciﬁcation implies a linear price relationship between non-
farm payroll surprises and the implied return.
In order to capture the impact of an internal precision signal (in accordance with
Section 11.2), we allow for non-linear price responses to news in nonfarm payrolls by
including power functions of this ﬁgure into the set of explanatory variables. To keep the
model tractable, we allow for this ﬂexibility only in the interval from 8:30-8:32, where
most of the price movements after employmant announcements typically are realized.
Correspondingly, we model the impact of surprises in nonfarm payrolls based on the
regressors
x′
t =
 
..., D8:30 , D8:30 · SNF , D8:30 · S2
NF , D8:30 · S3
NF ,...
 
.
11Nevertheless, there might be heteroscedasticity components which are still ignored in our speciﬁ-
cation. Therefore, we use robust standard errors in accordance with Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).
16To estimate the most general (unrestricted) model allowing for both internal and ex-
ternal precision signals (in accordance with Section 11.3) we diﬀerentiate between pre-
cise and imprecise announcements by interacting the corresponding regressors with a
dummy variable Dπlow which takes on a value of one if the external precision signal is
below its sample median and zero otherwise:
x′
t =
 
..., D8:30 · Dπlow, D8:30 · Dπhigh,
D8:30 · SNF · Dπlow, D8:30 · SNF · Dπhigh,
D8:30 · S2
NF · Dπlow, D8:30 · S2
NF · Dπhigh,
D8:30 · S3
NF · Dπlow, D8:30 · S3
NF · Dπhigh,...
 
,
where Dπhigh = 1−Dπlow. This approach is ﬂexible enough to allow for a wide variety
of shapes of the price response function. Starting with the linear speciﬁcation, the con-
ventional constant price impact coeﬃcient is obtained as a reference case. Increasing
the order of included polynomials allows us to test whether more non-linear terms are
needed to describe the price response function appropriately. In addition, by interact-
ing these terms with dummy variables indicating a low or high value of the external
precision signal, we can analyze whether the shapes of the price response functions
diﬀer and thus gain insights regarding the relative weight, market participants place on
internal and external precision signals.
In order to keep the model parsimonious and tractable, we mainly concentrate on the
price response induced by announcements in nonfarm payrolls, which are by far the
most inﬂuential macroeconomic headline ﬁgure.
173 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we will analyze whether we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence for S-shaped price response functions in accordance with Section
11.2. Second, we will investigate the impact of external precision signals on the strength
and the shape of the price response in line with Section 11.3.
3.1 Non-linearities in Price Response due to Internal Precision Sig-
nals
Table 1 reports estimation results based on ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁcations of equation (9).
The lag order of the autoregressive components is chosen according to the Bayes infor-
mation criterion (BIC) and reveals an AR(2)-ARCH(3) speciﬁcation as the preferred
model. Aside from the variables discussed in the previous section, the conditional mean
function includes additional variables consisting of surprises in the unemployment rate
SUN as well as revisions in the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure RNF. Moreover, we allow for
potential information leakage eﬀects in the interval 8:28-8:30 as well as lagged price
responses in the interval 8:32-8:34.
As a starting point, speciﬁcation (A) provides estimation results for a basic model that
does not account for any release-speciﬁc precision of unanticipated information. The
results conﬁrm several major ﬁndings of previous studies:12 First, the large values of
the highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of D8:30 · SNF and D8:30 · SUN show that surprising
headline information has a strong and signiﬁcant impact on intraday returns. The
directions of observed price reactions are consistent with standard theory, i.e., T-bond
futures prices rise in response to ’good’ news from the factor labor, i.e., a lower than
12See, for example, Becker et al. (1996), Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), Fleming and Remolona
(1999a, b, c), or Hautsch and Hess (2002) for bond markets and Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998)
or Andersen et al. (2003) for foreign exchange markets.
18expected increase in nonfarm payrolls and a higher than expected unemployment rate.
Second, markets process unanticipated headline information very rapidly. As indicated
by the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of D8:32 · SUN and the relatively small coeﬃcient of
D8:32 ·SNF (as compared to D8:30 ·SNF), the price reaction is completed within two to
four minutes.
Speciﬁcations (B) - (E) allow for non-linearities in price responses. Speciﬁcally, the
variables capturing the immediate price impact of unanticipated information in the
nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure D8:30·SNF are included as polynomial terms up to order three.
Note that the theoretical Bayesian learning model with uncertain news’ precision sug-
gests that price reactions are symmetric around zero. Nevertheless, the imposed poly-
nomials also allow for non-symmetric price responses. In particular, previous empirical
studies suggest asymmetric eﬀects of ’good’ and ’bad’ news in response to information
releases.13
Speciﬁcation (B) shows estimation results for a quadratic speciﬁcation of the price
response, while speciﬁcation (C) includes terms up to the third order. Corresponding
likelihood ratio (LR) tests clearly reject the linear speciﬁcation (A) in favor of the
non-linear models. Hence, higher order terms provide additional explanatory power for
price responses to unanticipated information in the nonfarm payroll ﬁgure. On a 1%-
level, the more parsimonious speciﬁcation (C) with terms up to the third order may
not be rejected in favor of (D) and (E). Overall, in line with the LR tests, the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) suggests that speciﬁcation (C) explains price responses
best.
The results imply that the standard Bayesian learning model with a constant price re-
sponse to unanticipated information can clearly be rejected. As an illustration, Figure
13See, e.g. Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002), Andersen et al. (2003) and Hautsch and Hess
(2007).
192 shows the estimated price-response curve to releases of the nonfarm payroll ﬁgure un-
der speciﬁcation (C). We ﬁnd clear evidence for an S-shaped price response where price
reactions to big surprises are relatively weaker than reactions to small surprises. This
suggests that market participants evaluate the amount of unanticipated information
contained in an announcement as an internal signal of information precision conﬁrming
the model by Subramanyam (1996).
3.2 External Precision Signals and the Strength of the Price Response
In order to investigate the impact of the external precision measure ˆ ρA, we split the
variable D8:30 · SNF (including higher order terms) into interactions with the dummy
variables Dπhigh and Dπlow accounting for high vs. low values of πm.
The estimation results based on alternative speciﬁcations of the immediate price re-
sponse function are given in Table 2. The results for speciﬁcation (F) conﬁrm the ﬁnd-
ings in Hautsch and Hess (2007) that more precise information leads to signiﬁcantly
stronger price adjustments. Note that this base case does not account for nonlinear
price adjustments but does imply a linear price reaction, as graphically illustrated in
Figure 3. A comparison of the goodness-of-ﬁt of speciﬁcations (A) and (F) based on the
BIC suggests that the inclusion of precision dummies leads to a signiﬁcant improvement
in the model’s goodness-of-ﬁt. This impression is conﬁrmed on the basis of a LR test,
which clearly rejects speciﬁcation (A) in favor of (F).
In speciﬁcations (G)-(L), the precision dummies are interacted with diﬀerent power
functions of SNF of an order up to three. It turns out that orders higher than three are
not required and do not signiﬁcantly improve the model ﬁt. In order to gain suﬃcient
insights into the underlying nonlinear eﬀects, we consider alternative speciﬁcations
based on diﬀerent polynomial functions. Speciﬁcation (H) includes third-order terms
20for low values of the external precision signal, i.e., for Dπlow = 1, and ﬁrst-order terms
for high values of the external precision signal (for speciﬁcation (I), the reverse is true).
Model (J) includes third-order terms for Dπlow = 1 and captures quadratic impacts for
Dπhigh = 1 (again, for model (K), the reverse is true). The most comprehensive model
(L) includes third-order terms for both low and high values of the external precision
signal. However, the LR tests as well as the BIC values favour speciﬁcation (J). Figure
4 provides a graphical illustration of the estimated price response curves for the best
performing speciﬁcation (J) over the range of observed surprise values.
Finally, a comparison of the models underlying Sections 11.2 and 11.3 is performed
on the basis of a LR test of speciﬁcation (L) against speciﬁcation (C). Here, speciﬁ-
cation (C) is clearly rejected.14 Note that speciﬁcations (C) and (J) yield nearly the
same BIC values, which indicates that precision eﬀects do not signiﬁcantly improve
the model’s goodness-of-ﬁt over the whole 90-minute period. However, this is due to
the fact that price adjustments are mainly observed over the two to four minutes after
the announcement, corresponding to 2-4% of the sample. In this sense, the BIC is not
very informative about the statistical (and economic) importance of precision eﬀects.
Therefore, we instead rely on the signiﬁcance of estimates and the employed LR tests
which reﬂect that short-term price adjustments are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by precision
eﬀects.
Thus, we can summarize that both the internal and external precision signals contribute
to the explanation of diﬀerences in the strength of the price reaction. This suggests that
traders try to infer information precision from diﬀerent sources, not only by looking
at the magnitude of the surprise as suggested by Subramanyam (1996), but also by
inspecting additional detail information related to the headline ﬁgures, as suggested by
Hautsch and Hess (2007).
14Note that model (C) is not nested in (J), and thus a LR test is not applicable.
21As shown in Figure 4, prices react in a rather non-linear way if the perceived precision is
low. We ﬁnd strong evidence for an S-shaped price response curve, as predicted by the
model in Subramanyam (1996). In particular, the price response coeﬃcient decreases for
absolute surprises in the positive as well as negative surprise range. For large, negative
surprises, we even obtain some evidence of a negative marginal price reaction.
Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that the S-shape of the price response curve is dampened
if the external precision signal is high. In that case, the curvature of the price response
function signiﬁcantly declines, and we observe a nearly linear relationship between price
changes and surprises; if an announcement ﬁgure is perceived to be of high precision,
market participants react to big surprises with a strength similar to that of the re-
action to small surprises. In contrast, if the external precision measure indicates that
the announced information is of low quality, investors react more moderately to larger
surprises. Given the nearly linear shape of the price response curve in a state of high in-
formation precision, we might be tempted to argue that market participants completely
ignore the internal precision signal if the perceived precision is high.
However, the model derived in 11.3 suggests that the opposite is true. In fact, non-
linearities in the price response should be more pronounced for a high value of the
external precision signal (recall Figure 1 for an illustration). Within our sample period,
we might not have suﬃciently large surprise values to observe the situation depicted by
Figure 1 (a). Presumably, we face the situation illustrated by Figure 1 (b), where the
curvature is dampened in a relatively narrow region around zero and the price response
curve becomes almost linear when precision is high. Consequently, we should be careful
in interpreting the reduced non-linearities in the price-response curve in periods of high
precision.
Note that our results are robust regarding the imposed functional form of the price re-
22sponse relationship. Instead of capturing potential nonlinearities based on power func-
tions, we also estimated the model based on ﬂexible Fourier forms deﬁned over the
range of surprises. The fact that we get quantitatively the same results indicates the
robustness of our ﬁndings.15
As can be seen from the following example, our results are also signiﬁcant from an eco-
nomic perspective. Assume that market participants observe a median-sized piece of
’good’ nonfarm payrolls news (i.e., a nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure which is 0.06% lower than
the median forecast) in connection with a ’low’ external precision. According to the best
performing speciﬁcation (J) and accounting for both the internal and external precision,
prices increase by about 0.31% in response to this release. If, instead, market partici-
pants ignore both precision signals (in accordance with the standard Bayesian learning
model in speciﬁcation (A)), prices would increase by about 0.22%. Hence, ignoring both
precision signals would lead to a severe underestimation of the price response by about
one third. In contrast, suppose that an extreme surprise of SNF = −0,18% is observed,
corresponding to the 90% quantile for ’good news,’ again in connection with a ’low’ ex-
ternal precision signal. Since the internal signal suggests a very low precision, according
to speciﬁcation (J), prices react only slightly more strongly, i.e., we would observe a
return of 0,36%. However, ignoring both precision signals would strongly overestimate
price responses by 89% and result in an expected return of 0,67%.
Overall, these results provide strong evidence in favor of the claim of Bayesian learning
that the perceived quality of information plays an important role in determining its
price impact. The results suggest that market participants actually use internal as well
as external signals to determine the precision of released news. Ignoring the available
information on news’ precision may result in strong over- or underestimations of the
15For sake of brevity, the latter results are not included in the paper, but they are available upon
request from the authors.
23price reaction.
4 Conclusion
If agents in ﬁnancial markets are confronted with new information, they process it by
adjusting their expectations on asset values. Bayesian learning provides a concept for
processing this information consistently. Since, in contrast to standard assumptions, the
precision of information is rarely available to market participants, we derive diﬀerent
settings of Bayesian learning models which allow for uncertainty in the precision of
news. Within these models, one common principle remains true: Market participants’
perception of information quality plays a major role in determining the strength of price
adjustments. However, this perception of precision may be based on diﬀerent precision
signals.
The theoretical models show that the amount of unanticipated information in an an-
nouncement may provide traders with an ‘internal’ signal of its precision, i.e., the price
response coeﬃcient is decreasing with the magnitude of surprises. In addition, price
responses to news may be inﬂuenced by ‘external’ signals of news precision, such as the
reputation of an auditing company, the reliability of a newspaper or the data coverage
of an agency. If we observe a high value for such an external precision measure, the price
response to a given surprise is relatively stronger than in a situation of low perceived
precision.
To test these implications, we focus on the most inﬂuential macroeconomic report, i.e.,
the U.S. employment release. In its headline ﬁgures, this report does not contain any
release-speciﬁc precision measures. Instead, market participants may extract precision
measures of the released headline ﬁgures by analyzing related detail information. As
suggested by Hautsch and Hess (2007), revisions of previously announced ﬁgures in
24conjunction with the cross-sectional standard deviations of analysts’ forecasts may be
used to derive such an external precision measure.
We investigate the price reaction of CBOT T-bond futures to these employment an-
nouncements using high-frequency data. The price response curves extracted from the
data illustrate a non-linear price impact of information depending on its surprise com-
ponent. As predicted by the theory, our empirical results suggest that market partic-
ipants seem to interpret the magnitude of the surprise contained in a news release as
an internal indication of its precision. Consequently, if traders observe an announce-
ment that strongly deviates from their expectations, they tend to conclude that this
announcement is imprecise.
Using the precision measures proposed by Hautsch and Hess (2007) as an additional
external signal of the precision of the released data, we conﬁrm the strong link between
the perceived precision of news and the price response. If the precision signal derived
from past revision data indicates a high relative precision level of news, market prices
react stronger to the unanticipated part of the data. If the external precision signal
indicates a poor quality of the released ﬁgures, market prices react only weakly.
Overall, our empirical analysis provides evidence in favor of Bayesian learning in cases
where the precision of news is uncertain. The results show that the quality of news
signiﬁcantly determines the implied price impact. The results also suggest that if exact
quality measures for a release are missing, traders try to infer news’ precision by drawing
on diﬀerent sources. When observing a piece of news, they assess for themselves how
precise it is. Market participants seem to include in these assessments information on
the reliability of the source of the message.
To our knowledge, the present analysis is the ﬁrst that describes the impact of these
two simultaneous – internal and external – precision signals in a uniﬁed framework.
25Such Bayesian learning models accounting for uncertain news precision provide further
insight into price formation mechanisms and help to assess risky positions. For example,
to infer how the release of an unexpectedly high unemployment ﬁgure will aﬀect the
value of a bond portfolio, traders and portfolio managers need to use an adequate
model for the price impact of employment data. We show that ignoring the available
information on announcements’ precision may result in strong over- or underestimations
of the price impact of news.
26Appendix A
We ﬁrst derive the posterior beliefs of traders after observing an announcement and a
proxy for the precision of the signal. Recall the assumption that the random variables
A and ˆ ρA are conditionally independent given the precision ρA, i.e.
fA,ˆ ρA|ρA(A, ˆ ρA | ρA) = fA|ρA(A | ρA)fˆ ρA|ρA(ˆ ρA | ρA). (11)
Then, the conditional expectation of X given A and ˆ ρA is given by
µP = E [X | A, ˆ ρA]
= E [E [X | A, ˆ ρA,ρA] | A, ˆ ρA]
= E [µF + (A − µF)ρA/ρF | A, ˆ ρA]
= µF + E [(A − µF)ρA/ρF | A, ˆ ρA]
= µF + (A − µF)E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA]/ρF
≡ µF + S · π(S, ˆ ρA).
The expected precision of the announcement is given as
E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA] =
 
SA
ρAf(ρA | A, ˆ ρA)dρA
=
 
SA
ρA
f(A, ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)
f(A, ˆ ρA)
dρA
=
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
f(A, ˆ ρA)
=
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A, ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
=
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
,
where the support of f(ρA) is given by SA ∈ (ρF,∞).
Using these relations we now turn to the proofs of the particular theorems.
27Proof of Theorem 1: Note that ∂f(A | ρA)∂S2 =
 
−1
2ρA
 
f(A | ρA), since we
assumed that A is conditionally normally distributed given ρA. We need to show that
the partial derivative of the conditional expected precision with respect to the absolute
surprise is strictly negative.
∂E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA]
∂S2 =
∂
∂S2
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
=
( ∂
∂S2
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
(
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
−
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA( ∂
∂S2
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)
(
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
=
−1
2
 
SA ρ2
Af(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
(
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
−
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA(−1
2)
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
(
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
= −
 
SA ρ2
Af(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
2
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
+
(
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
2(
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
= −
1
2
  
SA ρ2
Af(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
−
  
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 2

= −
1
2
 
E[ρ2
A | A, ˆ ρA] − (E[ρA | A, ˆ ρA])2 
= −
1
2
V ar[ρA | A, ˆ ρA] < 0,
for any non-degenerate distribution of the precision ρA. Since |S| and S2 are positively
and monotonically related, the result can be applied for |S|. Then, it is straightforwardly
shown that ∂π(S, ˆ ρA)/∂|S| < 0. ￿
28Proof of Theorem 2: Note that ∂f(A | ρA)∂S = −ρASf(A | ρA), since we assume
that A is conditionally normally distributed given ρA. Then,
∂E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA]
∂S
= 2S ·
∂E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA]
∂S2 .
Hence, using Theorem 1 we get
∂E [ρA | A, ˆ ρA]
∂S
= −S · V ar[ρA | A, ˆ ρA]
and thus
∂(µP − µF)
∂S
= π(S, ˆ ρA) +
S
ρF
∂E[ρA|A, ˆ ρA]
∂S
= π(S, ˆ ρA) −
S2
ρF
V ar[ρA | A, ˆ ρA].
￿
29Proof of Theorem 3: Note that ∂f(ˆ ρA | ρA)∂ˆ ρA =
 
−
ˆ ρA−ρA
2σ2
ˆ ρA
 
f(ˆ ρA | ρA), since we
assume a normal distribution for ˆ ρA. We need to show that the partial derivative of the
conditional expected precision with respect to the precision signal is strictly positive,
∂E[ρA | A, ˆ ρA]
∂ˆ ρA
=
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)
∂f(ˆ ρA|ρA)
∂ˆ ρA f(ρA)dρA
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 2
−
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 
SA f(A | ρA)
∂f(ˆ ρA|ρA)
∂ˆ ρA f(ρA)dρA
  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 2
=
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)
 
−
ˆ ρA−ρA
2σ2
ˆ ρA
 
f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 2
−
 
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 
SA f(A | ρA)
 
−
ˆ ρA−ρA
2σ2
ˆ ρA
 
f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 2
=
1
2σ2
ˆ ρA
  
SA ρ2
Af(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
−
  
SA ρAf(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA  
SA f(A | ρA)f(ˆ ρA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
 2

=
1
2σ2
ˆ ρA
 
E[ρ2
A | A, ˆ ρA] − (E[ρA | A, ˆ ρA])
2
 
=
1
2σ2
ˆ ρA
V ar[ρA | A, ˆ ρA] > 0,
for any non-degenerate distribution of the precision ρA. Then, it is straightforwardly
shown that ∂π(S, ˆ ρA)/∂ˆ ρA > 0 and ∂|µP − µF|/∂ˆ ρA > 0. ￿
30Proof of Theorem 4: The posterior mean of X is written as
µP = E [X | A, ˆ ρA]
= E [E [X | A,ρF,ρA, ˆ ρA] | A, ˆ ρA]
= E [(A − µF)ρA/ρF + µF | A, ˆ ρA]
= µF + (A − µF) · E [ρA/ρF | A, ˆ ρA]
= µF + (A − µF) ·
 
SF
 
SA
ρA/ρFf(A, ˆ ρA | ρA,ρF)f(ρA,ρF)dρAdρF
= µF + (A − µF) ·
 
SF
1/ρF
 
SA
ρAf(A, ˆ ρA | ρA,ρF)f(ρA | ρF)dρA
      
E[ρA|A,ρF,ˆ ρA]
f(ρF)dρF
≡ µF + (A − µF) · π(S, ˆ ρA).
Using the result established in Theoreom 1, we can show
∂π(S)/∂S2 =
∂
∂S2
 
SF
1/ρF
 
SA
ρAf(A, ˆ ρA | ρA,ρF)f(ρA | ρF)dρAf(ρF)dρF
=
 
SF
1/ρF
∂
 
SA ρAf(A, ˆ ρA | ρA,ρF)f(ρA | ρF)dρA
∂S2 f(ρF)dρF
=
 
SF
1/ρF
∂E [ρA | A,ρF, ˆ ρA]
∂(S2)
      
<0
f(ρF)dρF < 0.
Here, the price response coeﬃcient π(S, ˆ ρA) is just a weighted average of the price
response coeﬃcients in the case of known variance of the prior information weighted
by the corresponding probability. Hence, the results established by Theorems 1 and 3
still hold. ￿
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FIGURE 1:
Price response curves resulting from the Bayesian learning model
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(a) Large range of surprises
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(b) Small range of surprises
x-axis: surprises in the announcement S = (A − µA), i.e. deviations of the announced ﬁgure
from its mean, y-axis: price responses, i.e. changes in expectations µP − µF. The graphs show a
numerical example of price response curves given the model speciﬁcation in section 11.3. Prior beliefs
are normally distributed with µF = 0 and ρF = 1, while news’ precision ρA follows a truncated gamma
distribution with scale parameter λ = 1 and shape parameter r = 1. Additionally, an external estimate
of news’ precision ˆ ρA is observed which is normally distributed as ˆ ρA ∼ N(ρA,σˆ ρA). Price response
curves are increasing in the observed value of the precision proxy, the graphs correspond to external
precision signals of ˆ ρA = 0.5,1,1.5 while we choose σˆ ρA = 0.25.
32FIGURE 2:
Estimated price-response curve allowing for internal precision signals
x-axis: surprises in the U.S. nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure SNF (in percentage points), y-axis: estimated price
response ˆ rt (log-returns ×1000). This ﬁgure provides an illustration of the price response curve to surprises
in announcements of nonfarm payrolls ﬁgures corresponding to speciﬁcation (C) in table 1. The results are
based on a QML estimation of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for two-minute log returns during the intraday
interval 8:22-9:52 a.m. EST on employment announcement days on which no other macroeconomic report
was released at the same time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations
(i.e., 161 days with no overlapping announcements × 45 two-min intervals). According to the Bayes infor-
mation criterion (BIC), the model that includes polynomial terms in nonfarm payrolls surprises up to the
third order provides the best speciﬁcation. Thus, as predicted by the theoretical model, the resulting price
response curves are non-linear, since big surprises serve as a signal for low news’ precision. Therefore, big
surprises in the announced ﬁgure lead to relatively weaker price reactions than small surprises do.
33FIGURE 3:
Estimated linear price-response curves for high and low external precision
signals
x-axis: surprises in the U.S. nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure SNF (in percentage points), y-axis: estimated price
response ˆ rt (log-returns ×1000). A graphical illustration of the price response curve to nonfarm payrolls
ﬁgures as described by speciﬁcation (F) in table 2. The results are based on a QML estimation of AR(2)-
ARCH(3) models for two-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22 - 9:52 a.m. EST on employment
announcement days for which no other macroeconomic report is released at the same time. The sample
period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e., 161 days with no overlapping an-
nouncements × 45 two-min intervals). The curve corresponding to high precision signals has a signiﬁcantly
larger slope. A higher external precision signal leads to stronger price reactions given the same amount of
unexpected information in a news release.
34FIGURE 4:
Estimated price-response curves allowing for internal and external precision
signals
x-axis: surprises in the U.S. nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure SNF (in percentage points), y-axis: estimated price
response ˆ rt (log-returns ×1000). A graphical illustration of the price response curve to nonfarm payrolls
ﬁgures as described by speciﬁcation (J) in table 2. The results are based on a QML estimation of AR(2)-
ARCH(3) models for two-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22-9:52 a.m. EST on employment
announcement days on which no other macroeconomic report was released at the same time. The sample
period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e., 161 days with no overlapping an-
nouncements × 45 two-min intervals). Prices tend to react more strongly to news with a high precision
signal. For high precision signals, polynomial terms in nonfarm payroll surprises are captured only up to
the second order, while for low precision signals, terms up to the third order are included.
35TABLE 1
Estimation of price response functions
with surprises as an internal precision signal
Model (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Mean equation
cons -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002
D
8:28 · SNF 4,406 3,619 3,927 4,078 3,829
D
8:30 -0,080 0,530 0,355 0,558 0,637
D
8:30 · S
1
NF -37,873*** -42,415*** -53,447*** -54,909*** -50,344***
D
8:30 · S
2
NF -91,220** -55,336* -119,526 -145,530
D
8:30 · S
3
NF 531,752*** 624,49*** 80,073
D
8:30 · S
4
NF 1658,397 2337,978
D
8:30 · S
5
NF 9945,756
D
8:32 · SNF -4,000** -4,322** -4,274** -4,181** -4,277**
D
8:28 · SUN 1,636 1,278 1,320 1,314 1,175
D
8:30 · SUN 5,003** 5,617** 5,746*** 6,212*** 6,367***
D
8:32 · SUN 1,448* 1,325 1,356 1,332 1,286
D
8:28 · RNF 2,206 1,841 2,010 1,999 1,839
D
8:30 · RNF -6,872*** -6,390*** -6,215** -5,889** -5,808**
D
8:32 · RNF 0,083 -0,428 -0,071 -0,106 -0,258
rt−1 -0,091*** -0,091*** -0,090*** -0,090*** -0,091***
rt−2 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Variance equation
cons 0,439*** 0,439*** 0,436*** 0,436*** 0,437***
ARCH(1) 0,148** 0,141*** 0,146*** 0,145*** 0,144***
ARCH(2) 0,057*** 0,059*** 0,058*** 0,058*** 0,058***
ARCH(3) 0,031*** 0,033*** 0,034*** 0,034*** 0,034***
LL -8020,69 -7999,57 -7987,29 -7985,32 -7984,12
BIC 2,2485 2,2439 2,2417 2,2424 2,2433
LR-Test against model (A) 42,24*** 66,80*** 70,73*** 73,13***
LR-Test against model (B) 24,56*** 28,49*** 30,89***
LR-Test against model (C) 3,93** 6,33**
LR-Test against model (D) 2,40
36TABLE 1 (continued)
QML estimation of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for two-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22-9:52
a.m. EST on employment announcement days for which no other macroeconomic report is released at the
same time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e. 161 days with
no overlapping announcements × 45 2-min intervals).
The estimated model for log returns rt is given by rt = c +
P2
j=1 φjrt−j + x
′
tβ + εt, where εt ∼ N(0,ht),
t indexes the ﬁrst interval after the announcement, 8:30-8:32 a.m., xt denotes a vector of explanatory
variables and β is the corresponding coeﬃcient vector. ht is given by ht = ω +
P3
j=1 ψjε
2
t−j + st, where
st = δ
s · t +
P5
j=1
`
δ
s
c,j cos(j · t · 2π) + δ
s
s,j sin(j · t · 2π)
´
denotes the seasonality function based on the
parameters δ
s, δ
s
c,j, δ
s
s,j and a normalized time trend t ∈ [0,1] given by the elapsed time (in minutes) in
the interval 8:22 to 9:52 a.m. divided by 90. The estimated seasonality parameters are omitted in the
table.
The regressors xt are the surprise in U.S. nonfarm payrolls, SNF, and in unemployment rates, SUN, as
well as revisions of nonfarm payrolls RNF interacted with time dummies indicating the intervals 8:28-8:30
a.m. (D
8:28), 8:30-8:32 a.m. (D
8:30) and 8:32-8:34 a.m. (D
8:32). To capture non-linear immediate price
responses in the interval 8:30-8:32, surprises in nonfarm payrolls SNF are included as polynomials up to
the order 5. Surprises are computed based on U.S. employment report ﬁgures released by the BLS and
consensus forecasts provided by Informa Global Markets, formerly MMS.
The table reports the log likelihood (LL), the Bayes information criterion (BIC) and χ
2 statistics of LR
tests on the inequality of individual parameters. Statistical inference is based on QML standard errors
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992).
∗∗∗,
∗∗, and
∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Except for the LR tests, the level of signiﬁcance is based on two-sided tests.
37TABLE 2
Estimation of price response functions
diﬀerentiated by low and high values of the additional external precision proxy
Model (F) (G) (H) (I)
Mean equation
cons -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002
D
8:28 · SNF 4,365 3,411 3,862 4,147
D
8:30 · D
πlow -0,074 0,782 0,611 -0,069
D
8:30 · D
πhigh -0,141 0,315 -0,131 0,203
D
8:30 · S
1
NF · D
πlow -30,439*** -34,498*** -46,901*** -30,356***
D
8:30 · S
1
NF · D
πhigh -47,601*** -53,413*** -47,713*** -56,190***
D
8:30 · S
2
NF · D
πlow -106,693** -77,937**
D
8:30 · S
2
NF · D
πhigh -87,544* -61,651
D
8:30 · S
3
NF · D
πlow 503,544**
D
8:30 · S
3
NF · D
πhigh 217,349
D
8:32 · SNF -4,020** -4,694** -4,422** -4,305**
D
8:28 · SUN 1,623 1,197 1,327 1,499
D
8:30 · SUN 5,553** 6,275*** 6,286*** 5,723**
D
8:32 · SUN 1,484* 1,286 1,414 1,349
D
8:28 · RNF 2,051 1,701 1,989 1,885
D
8:30 · RNF -5,901** -5,220** -5,424** -5,585**
D
8:32 · RNF -0,080 -0,664 0,010 -0,460
rt−1 -0,091*** -0,091*** -0,091*** -0,090***
rt−2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Variance equation
cons 0,437*** 0,437*** 0,437*** 0,437***
ARCH(1) 0,151** 0,143** 0,148** 0,148**
ARCH(2) 0,057*** 0,059*** 0,057*** 0,058***
ARCH(3) 0,032*** 0,035*** 0,033*** 0,034***
LL -8008,54 -7982,99 -7981,52 -8002,00
BIC 2,2476 2,2430 2,2426 2,2482
LR-Test against model (A) 24,30*** 75,40*** 78,34*** 37,38***
LR-Test against model (C)
LR-Test against model (F) 51,10*** 54,04*** 13,08***
38TABLE 2 (continued)
Estimation of price response functions
diﬀerentiated by low and high values of the additional external precision proxy
Model (J) (K) (L)
Mean equation
cons -0,002 -0,002 -0,002
D
8:28 · SNF 3,660 3,400 3,651
D
8:30 · D
πlow 0,630 0,774 0,624
D
8:30 · D
πhigh 0,323 0,236 0,264
D
8:30 · S
1
NF · D
πlow -46,957*** -34,580*** -46,950***
D
8:30 · S
1
NF · D
πhigh -53,605*** -55,948*** -55,534***
D
8:30 · S
2
NF · D
πlow -78,320** -106,453** -78,297**
D
8:30 · S
2
NF · D
πhigh -89,156* -66,847 -73,585
D
8:30 · S
3
NF · D
πlow 512,233** 509,326**
D
8:30 · S
3
NF · D
πhigh 186,343 141,106
D
8:32 · SNF -4,692** -4,693** -4,692**
D
8:28 · SUN 1,169 1,207 1,176
D
8:30 · SUN 6,694*** 6,097*** 6,556***
D
8:32 · SUN 1,230 1,338 1,267
D
8:28 · RNF 1,707 1,745 1,744
D
8:30 · RNF -4,736** -5,464** -4,932**
D
8:32 · RNF -0,549 -0,510 -0,435
rt−1 -0,091*** -0,091*** -0,091***
rt−2 0,000 0,000 0,000
Variance equation
cons 0,436*** 0,437*** 0,436***
ε
2
t−1 0,146** 0,143** 0,146**
ε
2
t−2 0,059*** 0,059*** 0,058***
ε
2
t−3 0,035*** 0,035*** 0,035***
LL -7974,53 -7982,74 -7974,38
BIC 2,2419 2,2441 2,2431
LR-Test against model (A) 92,32*** 75,90*** 92,62***
LR-Test against model (C) 25,82***
LR-Test against model (F) 68,02*** 51,59*** 68,31***
LR-Test against model (G) 16,92*** 0,50 17,21***
LR-Test against model (H) 13,98*** 14,27***
LR-Test against model (I) 38,51*** 55,22***
LR-Test against model (J) 0,29
LR-Test against model (K) 16,71***
39TABLE 2 (continued)
QML estimation of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for two-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22-9:52
a.m. EST on employment announcement days for which no other macroeconomic report is released at the
same time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e. 161 days with
no overlapping announcements × 45 2-min intervals).
The estimated model for log returns rt is given by rt = c +
P2
j=1 φjrt−j + x
′
tβ + εt, where εt ∼ N(0,ht),
t indexes the ﬁrst interval after the announcement, 8:30-8:32 a.m., xt denotes a vector of explanatory
variables and β is the corresponding coeﬃcient vector. ht is given by ht = ω +
P3
j=1 ψjε
2
t−j + st, where
st = δ
s · t +
P5
j=1
`
δ
s
c,j cos(j · t · 2π) + δ
s
s,j sin(j · t · 2π)
´
denotes the seasonality function based on the
parameters δ
s, δ
s
c,j, δ
s
s,j and a normalized time trend t ∈ [0,1] given by the elapsed time (in minutes) in
the interval 8:22 to 9:52 a.m. divided by 90. The estimated seasonality parameters are omitted in the
table.
The regressors xt are the surprise in U.S. nonfarm payrolls, SNF, and in unemployment rates, SUN,
as well as revisions of nonfarm payrolls RNF interacted with time dummies indicating the intervals
8:28-8:30 a.m. (D
8:28), 8:30-8:32 a.m. (D
8:30) and 8:32-8:34 a.m. (D
8:32). Surprises are computed based
on U.S. employment report ﬁgures released by the BLS and consensus forecasts provided by Informa
Global Markets (IGM), formerly MMS. The variables SNF are included as polynomials up to order 3 and
interact with dummy variables D
π high (D
π low) which takes on the value 1 if estimated price-response
coeﬃcient ˆ πm at month m is higher (lower) than its sample median, and 0 otherwise. ˆ πm is given
by ˆ πm = ˆ ρA,m/(ˆ ρF,m + ˆ ρA,m), where ˆ ρA,m = 1/ˆ gm+1|m, ˆ gm+1|m is the one-step-ahead prediction of
the conditional variance of (percentage) revision of the nonfarm payroll ﬁgure in month m, ˙ RNF,m,
computed based on rolling sample ARMA-GARCH models for the time series of historical revisions,
and ˆ ρF,m = 1/ˆ s
2
F,m with ˆ sF,m denoting the cross-sectional standard deviation of IGM forecasts for the
employment release for a particular month m.
The table reports the log likelihood (LL), the Bayes information criterion (BIC) and χ
2 statistics of LR
tests on the inequality of individual parameters. Statistical inference is based on QML standard errors
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992).
∗∗∗,
∗∗, and
∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Except for the LR tests, the level of signiﬁcance is based on two-sided tests.
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